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Abstract 
 
It is proposed that both human creativity and human consciousness are (unintended) consequences of the 
human brain’s extraordinary energy efficiency. The topics of creativity and consciousness are treated 
separately, though have a common sub-structure. It is argued that creativity arises from a synergy between 
two cognitive modes of the human brain (which broadly coincide with Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2). In the 
first, available energy is spread across a relatively large network of neurons. As such, the amount of energy per 
active neuron is so small that the operation of such neurons is susceptible to thermal (ultimately quantum 
decoherent) noise. In the second, available energy is focussed on a small enough subset of neurons to 
guarantee a deterministic operation. An illustration of how this synergy can lead to creativity with implications 
for computing in silicon are discussed. Starting with a discussion of the concept of free will, the notion of 
consciousness is defined in terms of an awareness of what are perceived to be nearby counterfactual worlds in 
state space. It is argued that such awareness arises from an interplay between our memories on the one hand, 
and quantum physical mechanisms (where, unlike in classical physics, nearby counterfactual worlds play an 
indispensable dynamical role) in the ion channels of neural networks. As with the brain’s susceptibility to 
noise, it is argued that in situations where quantum physics plays a role in the brain, it does so for reasons of 
energy efficiency. As an illustration of this definition of consciousness, a novel proposal is outlined as to why 
quantum entanglement appears so counter-intuitive.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
What does it mean to be human? Surely two of the defining characteristics are that of 
creativity and of consciousness (the latter being notoriously hard to define objectively). In 
this paper, a new perspective is speculatively proposed on the age-old problem of what it is 
physically about the human brain in particular which could account for these characteristics. 
In both cases, this proposal hinges around the notion of energy efficiency.  
 
The author’s interest in this subject arose by considering what must surely be one of the 
most profound paradoxes in computational neuroscience. For many years, attempts have 
been made to simulate parts of the brain on supercomputers. In the coming years, such 
simulations will start to use exascale high-performance computing. However, such 
computers will need 6 orders of magnitude more electrical power than the human brain 
itself needs (tens of megawatts rather than tens of watts). In Section 2, we review the 
arguments of Palmer and O’Shea (2015) that understanding this gross discrepancy in energy 
usage may provide a key clue to understanding the creative process, i.e. that creativity is an 
unintended consequence of the brain’s evolution towards the extraordinarily energy 
efficient assemblage of miniaturised neurons that it is. In particular it is proposed that 
creativity arises from a very strong synergy between two cognitive modes of operation  - 
one mode where limited available energy is focussed on a subset of neurons allowing these 
neurons to perform computations repeatably and reliably and where others are largely shut 
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down, and the other mode where available energy is spread more uniformly around the 
neuronal network, making them susceptible to thermal noise, who existence in the brain is 
widely acknowledged (Faisal et al, 2008; Rolls and Deco, 2010). Implications for silicon 
computers are discussed in Section 3.  
 
In Section 4, by analogy with thermal noise, we propose that quantum dynamics may play a 
role in the brain when it is energetically efficient to do so. As discussed, the power supply 
for action potentials in neural networks appears to be a case in point. We describe quantum 
physics as a theory where nearby counterfactual worlds in state space play a much more 
fundamental dynamical role than in classical physics and use this to give an explanation for 
our deeply held belief in free will.  In Section 5 we use this to provide a novel definition of 
consciousness. Here, we refer to consciousness as it relates to specific objects, i.e. in the 
sense of our being conscious of something. Being conscious of a specific object is then 
defined in terms of an ability to perceive that object as having an existence, independent of 
the rest of the field of view.  It is proposed that such consciousness arises from an interplay 
between our memories and the central dynamical role that nearby counterfactual states 
play in (e.g. the path integral representation of) quantum theory. As an illustration of this 
proposal, we discuss in Section 6, why we humans appear to find quantum entanglement so 
completely unintuitive.  
 
2.  Creativity 
 
Consider the following very elementary example of creative thinking: Euclid’s proof that 
there exists an unlimited number of prime numbers. Euclid starts by imagining the opposite: 
that the number N of primes is finite. This tactic is an essential step in many mathematical 
proofs (presumably even in Euclid’s day) and has such broad application that one would 
hardly say it is an especially creative step for this particular problem. Indeed, it can readily 
be coded into a putative algorithm for finding mathematical proofs. The creative step comes 
in multiplying together the N primes and adding one. Having formed this number, it is 
immediate that it is not divisible by one of the N primes.  
 
We will never know how Euclid (if indeed it was he) arrived at the idea of multiplying the 
primes together and adding one. Of course, in hindsight it seems so obvious that it is hard to 
imagine that one would do anything but this. However, conceivably Euclid may have started 
by adding the primes together, getting stuck, may have then multiplied them, getting stuck 
again, and may have given up, leaving his study to relax on the veranda. Then, in a moment 
of relaxation, the critical idea, “just add one” comes from nowhere. In an instant Euclid 
realises he had the proof he has been searching for.  
 
The creative process has been described by the renowned mathematician J.E. Littlewood 
(following Helmholz and Poincaré): 
 
 “It is usual to distinguish four phases in creation: preparation, incubation, illumination and 
verification…..Illumination, which can happen in a fraction of a second, is the emergence of 
the creative idea into the consciousness. This almost always occurs when the mind is in a 
state of relaxation…….” (Littlewood, 2004) 
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The same points have been emphasised by Andrew Wiles: 
 
“In particular, when you reach a real impasse, when there's a real problem that you want to 
overcome, then the routine mathematical thinking is of no use to you. Leading up to that 
kind of new idea there has to be a long period of tremendous focus on the problem without 
any distraction. You have to really think about nothing but that problem - just concentrate 
on it. Then you stop. Afterwards there seems to be a kind of period of relaxation during 
which the subconscious appears to take over and it's during that time that some new insight 
comes.” (Singh, 1997).  
 
The notion that creative ideas come when relaxing, is commonplace. It seems to be an 
essential part of the creative process. But why?  
 
The idea of changing from a mode of thinking where one focusses hard on a problem 
without distraction, to one where one simply relaxes, is suggestive of a switch in modes of 
cognition which Kahnemann (2012) refers to simply as “System 2” and “System 1” 
respectively. Kahnemann refers to System 2 as slow, effortful, logical, calculating; whilst 
System 1 is fast, automatic, frequent, emotional and stereotypic. Although it is simplistic to 
characterise cognition entirely in terms of such a dichotomy, it is conceptually convenient to 
do so here.  
 
Here a physical reason for the difference between System 1 and System 2 is proposed, by 
returning to the astonishing fact that the brain performs exascale data processing with 
about 20W of power. The brain has achieved such extraordinary energy efficiency through 
the process of miniaturisation (Niven and Farris, 2012): the axon diameter of neurons is 
frequently as slender as 0.1 microns. Now whilst larger neurons (say of diameter 1 micron 
or more) are reliably deterministic and transmit information rapidly due to their low 
resistance to axial current flow, they are energy inefficient. In particular, larger neurons 
require more ionic current to trigger a nerve impulse. Following a bout of impulses, critical 
ionic concentrations across the neuronal membrane must be restored by energy-consuming 
ionic pumps. There would not be adequate energy to power sufficient neurons to allow the 
sorts of cognitive analysis humans undertake, if our neurons had 1-micron diameter. By 
contrast, smaller neurons are more efficient because their high input resistance allows 
relatively small trans-membrane ionic currents to generate the voltage needed to trigger a 
nerve impulse. The process of miniaturisation has allowed the human brain to contain 
around 80 billion neurons (by contrast chimpanzees have about 7 billion) with very limited 
energy resources. 
 
There are potential disadvantages to such small neuronal diameters. Since signal 
transmission speed is smaller in slender neurons, reaction time to stimuli will be 
correspondingly slower. Hence, if fast reaction time is crucial for survival, then 
miniaturisation could be evolutionarily disadvantageous. However, with early hominids 
forming societal groups and learning to defend themselves collectively using primitive 
weapons, the need for ultra-fast reaction times may have started to become less important 
early in human history.  
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However, even though 20W may be sufficient to power a relatively large number of such 
slender neurons, it is still possible that it may not quite be sufficient to power a very large 
network of neurons so that they act repeatably and reliably in the presence of inevitable 
thermal noise (Faisal et al, 2008). For example, for very slender neurons, the ionic batteries 
positioned at key points along a neuron may each contain just a handful of ions. A 
consequence of limited energy is that the whole neuronal function can be susceptible to 
noise. Conventional neuroscience treats noise as an undesirable nuisance. For example, in 
their book “Principles of Neural Design”, Stirling and Laughlin (2017) comment: 
 
“Where noise is inevitable, it should be minimized before transmission, so most neural 
designs try to prevent noise or reduce it at early stages.” 
 
Whilst too much stochasticity would certainly be disadvantageous, a small degree of 
stochasticity could actually be advantageous, as Turing himself noted in his famous paper 
“The Imitation Game” (Turing, 1950). Deterministic heuristic algorithms for complex 
decision problems (e.g. the travelling salesman problem) can prove inefficient for particular 
problem instances, and in the worst case can lead to the algorithm “hanging” (Hoos and 
Stützle, 2005). Typically, there is a long “tail” in the distribution of problem instances where 
deterministic heuristics take an unacceptably long time to reach solution (Gomes et al, 
1998). From an evolutionary perspective, such “Buridian donkey” behaviour would 
obviously be undesirable, if not fatal in the presence of predators. By eliminating this long 
tail, a stochastic heuristic algorithm can be more computationally overall than any 
corresponding deterministic algorithm (even though such stochastic algorithms may be 
slower than their deterministic counterparts for problem instances where the latter reaches 
solution rapidly). A particularly well known and successful stochastic algorithm is Simulated 
Annealing, used to find the global minimum of some objective function. The stochastic 
algorithm allows the search process to jump from the potential well surrounding a local 
minimum to the potential well surrounding the global minimum, in ways which 
deterministic algorithms would find difficult or impossible.  
 
Here it is proposed that in System 2, available energy is focussed on a subset of neurons 
needed to perform a particular cognitive task as deterministically (and hence reliably and 
repeatably) as possible. This means that the limited energy available would be channelled to 
the specific parts of the brain needed to perform the computation, making this energy 
unavailable for performing other tasks. Kahneman notes that if you are out walking with a 
friend who suddenly asks you to multiply 23 by 17 (say), you may have to stop walking, close 
your eyes and essentially do nothing other than to focus on the task at hand. The neuronal 
processes needed to walk and talk and even process basic information coming from the 
sensory organs, have, in extremis, been switched off in System 2 mode. By contrast, in 
System 1 mode, one can happily walk, chew gum and simultaneously chat about the latest 
football results, since none of these activities requires unusual amounts of energy to be 
focussed on specific neuronal subsets.   
 
This suggests that available energy per active neuron in System 1 mode is less that the 
available energy per active neuron in System 2 mode. We therefore postulate that because 
of this, it is specifically when in System 1 mode that neuronal action can be susceptible to 
thermal noise. Perhaps this is the reason why both Littlewood and Wiles comment that the 
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creative moment comes when relaxing: it is in this state that a new idea can literally arise 
without prior reason. If we think of our present cognitive state in terms of a local minimum 
of some objective function whose global minimum defines the solution to the problem at 
hand, noise can take us out of the local minimum.  
 
That is to say, perhaps the notion of “adding one” to the product of primes occurred to 
Euclid by means of a stochastic process.  Perhaps the primitive stochastic idea was merely to 
“add some constant” and his System 2 immediately honed this down to adding one, rather 
than, say, two or ten. This serves to emphasise the notion that it is not simply the presence 
of noise that gives rise to creativity, it is the synergistic interplay between stochasticity and 
determinism associated with these two modes. This is consistent with Littlewood’s 
comment that the process of illumination (a System 1 process) needs to be followed by the 
process of verification (a System 2 process). Put another way, it requires System 2 to 
determine whether the random jump from the local potential well will lead us to the global 
minimum. Using the language of particle physics, the mathematical physicist Michael Berry 
describes the product of the process of illumination as a clariton, but notes that, by virtue of 
the process of verification, the clariton is all too frequently annihilated by its anti-clariton 
partner (Ball, 2016). On top of which, the chances of stochastically jumping to the right 
answer becomes increasingly unlikely, the less prepared the brain is with the problem at 
hand – hence the vital roles of preparation and incubation. 
 
One can feed students, or indeed program computers, with a “set of tricks” needed to prove 
mathematical theorems. “Just add one” could be one such trick. However, this trick is of no 
help in constructing a proof of perhaps the next simplest theorem in mathematics: that the 
square root of 2 is irrational. Indeed, one way of interpreting the Gödel-Turing theorem is 
that the set of tricks needed to prove mathematical theorems can never be taught. The fact 
that we humans are able to prove new mathematical theorems based on new mathematical 
tricks, could therefore be explained by the brain’s susceptibility to noise in System 1. 
Indeed, this susceptibility provides a practical explanation of the Lucas/Penrose puzzle: How 
is it that we are able to see the truth of the Gödel theorem if our brains operate by 
algorithm? In the final analysis, for particularly slender human neurons, such noise may 
have its ultimate source in the supposed randomness of quantum decoherence. In this case, 
the randomness of the noise is as non-algorithmic as it can be. The possible dependence on 
quantum processes is further developed in Sections 4-6 below.  
 
3. Lessons for Supercomputers 
 
We may be able to learn in designing next-generation supercomputers by understanding 
how the brain has become so energy efficient. For example, part of the energy cost of 
operating a supercomputer is the cost of ensuring that the computations are bit 
reproducible – e.g. that computations are not affected by the internal effects of thermal 
noise or of external perturbations like cosmic rays. We can reduce energy costs by turning 
down the voltage across the transistors. However, in so doing they act less reliably (Palem, 
2014). However, for a given unit of energy, one can ask what is more beneficial – a smaller 
number of precise computations, or a larger number of imprecise computations? The 
answer clearly depends on the application. In transferring sums of money from one bank 
account to another, it is clearly vital that precise bank account numbers are known. When 
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adding or multiplying two floating-point real numbers, it is important to ensure the 
exponents are manipulated correctly. However, it is clearly less important for the trailing 
mantissa bits to be calculated precisely. For many computations in turbulent fluid 
mechanics (such is relevant for climate research for example), it is not vital that precise 
computations are made, for the simple reason that the numerical approximations to the 
underlying fluid equations are not themselves precise. To avoid systematically rounding 
errors, these trailing bits should be represented by noise, rather than systematically setting 
them to zero.  
 
We have now reached the stage where it is no longer possible to shrink transistors any 
further and maintain complete determinism – energy dissipation would cause the circuitry 
to melt. As such, the current route to increased FLOP rates (floating point operations per 
second) is to combine more and more processors. The need to communicate across larger 
and larger networks of processors means that the energy costs are now dominated by the 
cost of transporting data from one processor to another (and to memory).  
 
However, here we can perhaps learn from the brain. Energy need only be supplied to 
processors according to the required accuracy of the computation. That is to say, as in 
System 1 mode, we can turn the voltage down across the transistors where only imprecise 
estimates are needed. In this way, some computations will be susceptible to noise. As with 
the simulated annealing algorithm, sometimes this noise can be beneficial to the 
computation. In weather and climate model simulations, noise is certainly advantageous 
(Palmer 2019a). A consequence of this is that in moving data from one part of the computer 
to another, it is only be necessary to transport those bits that contain useful information 
which is distinguishable from noise. It is simply wasteful to transport those bits that are 
essentially indistinguishable from noise. This can reduce energy consumption considerably. 
Such an imprecise supercomputer (Palmer, 2015) can be compared with a typical energy-
profligate scientific computation of today, where bit-reproducible arithmetic is computed 
using fixed precision (e.g. 64-bit floating point) real numbers. Currently there are no 
supercomputers with such imprecise capability, though the development of AI has meant 
that current computers are able to operate in some mixed precision mode, where 16- or 
even 8-bit variables can be efficiently processed.  
 
This in turn raises the question of what it would need to make a (silicon) computer that is 
truly intelligent e.g. in the sense of performing interesting mathematical research. We have 
argued that intelligence arises from a complex interplay between stochasticity and 
determinism. It is not a matter of pre-programming the degree of stochasticity (vs 
determinism) in a fixed non-interactive manner. Rather this degree would itself have to be 
controlled by an extremely interactive operating system (e.g. which would perceive when a 
part of the code was effectively hanging and which part was making rapid progress in a 
purely deterministic manner). To make optimal use of available energy, stochasticity should 
be produced in hardware, rather than through pseudo-random number generators, and 
only data containing useful information should be transported within the computer.  
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4. Quantum Physics, Counterfactuality, Free Will 
 
It has been known for some years that quantum dynamics can play a key role in many 
biological systems (Al-Khalili, J. and J. McFadden, 2014). As an example, relevant to the 
current discussion, Summhammer et al (2018) consider the motion of K+ ions in voltage-
gated ion channels in the neuronal membrane wall. They note that it is difficult to explain 
the high rates of ion flow using classical physics: the potential barriers are too high 
according to the classical Nernst-Planck equation. A key observation is that the de Broglie 
wavelengths of such ions at typical brain temperatures are comparable with the scale of the 
periodic structure of Coulomb potentials in the nano-pore structure of the ion-channel 
selectivity filter.  Solving a nonlinear Schrödinger equation, Summhammer et al show that 
the ionic wavefunction can be sufficiently spatially spread that the front part of the 
wavefunction can effectively manipulate the confining potentials in such a way as to allow 
the remaining part of the wavefunction to propagate through. In this way, a mechanism for 
ion conduction has been found that would be impossible to achieve classically unless the 
ions had much larger kinetic energy (which would be impossible given the energy available 
to power neuronal dynamics). The characteristic timescale for the operation of this process 
has to be short, around 1ps, to explain the fast and directed permeation of ions through the 
potential barriers of the filter. In this way, the Summhammer et al mechanism not only 
builds on, but requires decoherence timescales of around 1ps, entirely consistent with the 
range of decoherence timescales associated with biological systems (a problem with many 
other hypotheses involving quantum physics in consciousness).  
 
Consistent with the discussion above, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that the brain will 
use such a quantum process over a classical process when there is an energetic advantage to 
do so. Again, this becomes possible for the extreme miniaturisation of neurons in the human 
brain. However, what would be the consequences of this? 
 
To answer this question, one needs to ask what is the key physical difference between 
quantum and classical physics. A clue arises from the fact that the essential quantum 
constant of nature, Planck’s constant, has the dimension of position times momentum, i.e. 
the dimensions of the state space of a classical particle.  Classical theory can be thought of 
as arising in the limit when this dimensional constant is set equal to zero. This draws 
attention to the fact that a crucial difference between classical and quantum physics 
concerns the role of state space in the equations for dynamical evolution. In classical 
physics, a system’s dynamical evolution between two given states is determined by the 
state-space trajectory along which the classical “action” (the integral of the Lagrangian 
along the trajectory) is minimised. In particular, trajectories (or so-called histories) which 
neighbour this path of least action play no direct role in determining the dynamical 
evolution of the system.  
 
By contrast, in quantum theory dynamical evolution can be defined as a phase-weighted 
sum over trajectories in a region of state space (Feynman and Hibbs, 2010). Alternatively, in 
the De Broglie-Bohm representation of the Schrödinger equation, what makes the dynamics 
non-classical is the Bohmian quantum potential, a function, not in space-time, but on the 
configuration space of the system under investigation (Bohm and Hiley, 1993). Again, the 
presence of the quantum potential implies that one cannot isolate a single state-space 
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trajectory when defining dynamical evolution. Rather, quantum dynamical evolution in the 
physical world is in some sense “aware” of the existence of alternative state-space 
trajectories in state space. Indeed the fact that quantum computers can outperform 
classical computers for certain problems can be viewed in terms of an ability of a quantum 
computer to exploit the parallelism implied by such neighbourhoods of state-space 
trajectories, in a manner impossible by a classical computer. If the physics which determines 
our cognition is “aware” of these neighbourhood trajectories, could our cognition itself be 
similarly aware? 
 
From the perspective of some reference trajectory that we interpret as our physical world, 
such neighbouring state-space trajectories can be interpreted as counterfactual worlds: for 
example, worlds where some degrees of freedom are perturbed from the values that apply 
to the reference trajectory. Let us start by considering a “warm-up” for the problem of 
consciousness (discussed in the next section) - the deep-seated belief that many if not most 
of us have in the concept of free will. For many, this is the belief that “I could have done 
otherwise” (Kane, 2002). This definition supposes the meaningful existence of 
counterfactual worlds in which I did do otherwise. Perhaps in the counterfactual world I 
simply spent another fraction of a second looking to my right (keeping everything else in the 
world fixed). The consequences of this are easily deduced from our System 2 deductive 
reasoning: in this counterfactual world I would have seen the oncoming car, would not have 
pulled out of the turning, would not have collided with the car and would not have been in 
hospital for six months from where I write this paper (a fabricated example, fortunately). 
Whilst a world in which I didn’t spend six months in hospital is distant from the world in 
which I did, a world where I spent an extra fraction of a second looking right resembles the 
actual world in almost all respects and therefore seems extremely close to the actual world. 
As such, it seems intuitively plausible to us to view this counterfactual world as physically 
reasonable (though in Section 6 we discuss why this sense of intuition may be misleading 
us).   
 
Would I have such a strong belief in free will if the dynamics of our neural pathways was 
determined entirely by classical physics? For sure, it would be possible to refer back to past 
occasions (stored in my memory) where I did spend extra time looking left and right before 
turning out of some side road. However, these memories refer to different roads in 
different locations and certainly at different times. Does the memory of these past events 
explain the very visceral and deep-seated nature of the belief in the reality of the 
counterfactual world I looked right a fraction of a second longer for the particular road on 
the particular day when my accident occurred? I believe not. Of course, proving this 
unequivocally is impossible. Instead, using Littlewood’s “preparation, incubation, 
illumination, verification” approach to creativity,  the following assertion is made: that the 
notion of free will arises from a) a familiarity of different configurations of the world as 
stored in our memory (c.f. preparation and incubation), b) an awareness of nearby 
counterfactual worlds arising from the fact that (for reasons of energy efficiency) the  
dynamics of our neural pathways are partially influenced by quantum physical processes 
(c.f. illumination), c) an ability (using System 2) to project the consequences on such 
counterfactual worlds e.g. if I had looked right I wouldn’t now be in hospital (c.f. 
verification). Here b) takes the place of the susceptibility to stochasticity, and indeed, if the 
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origin of stochasticity is quantum decoherence, then there may be physical links between 
such processes in any case.  
 
 
5.  Consciousness 
 
The literature on consciousness is so voluminous that no attempt is made to summarise it 
here. (See for example Schneider S. and M. Velmans, 2017).  Instead, we attempt a novel 
definition of consciousness based on the ideas developed above. This section is necessarily 
very speculative in nature.  
 
If I look at a bowl of fruit in the middle of the table, I can become conscious of it. What does 
this mean? Here we explore the idea that to be conscious of the bowl of fruit denotes an 
ability to treat the bowl of fruit as somehow distinct from and hence independent of the 
other objects in my field of view (the table, the walls of the room and so on). To treat the 
bowl of fruit as having an existence distinct from the other objects in my field of view, 
implies, in principle at least, an ability to perturb the degrees of freedom associated with 
the bowl of fruit (e.g. its position on the table) independently of the degrees of freedom of 
all the other objects in my field of view (i.e. keeping the latter fixed). That is to say, to be 
conscious of the bowl of fruit is to have some awareness of the existence of counterfactual 
worlds where the degrees of freedom of the bowl of fruit are perturbed relative to the 
degrees of freedom of all other objects in my field of view. If, moreover, I decide to focus on 
the contents of the bowl of fruit, I may become aware of the fact that it comprises, say, 
apples, oranges and pears. According to the definition above, to be conscious of a particular 
piece of fruit implies being aware, at least implicitly, of the existence of counterfactual 
worlds where the degrees of freedom of this particular piece of fruit, e.g. its position 
relative to the other pieces of fruit in the bowl, are perturbed.  
 
From where does such awareness arise? Some would argue that it arises from the fact that 
in the past I have seen bowls of fruit in different positions on different tables, or of pieces of 
fruit arranged in different ways inside bowls of fruit. However, as in the discussion of free 
will, I do not believe that this explains the very visceral nature of consciousness. Again, a 
possible explanation is that our ability to perceive nearby counterfactual worlds arises from 
the fact that (for reasons of energy efficiency) quantum dynamics plays a central role in the 
operation of our neural networks, and just as quantum dynamics is aware of counterfactual 
worlds, so too our brains. It is then the interplay between this quantum-induced awareness 
of alternate worlds coupled with our memory of specific counterfactual worlds deemed 
close to the present one, that gives rise to the visceral nature of the experience we call 
consciousness.  
 
A potential problem with such a definition is that it suggests that merely imagining 
something in one’s mind’s eye (e.g. a flying pig) could be enough to be conscious of that 
something. In general, that is not so, although under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs, 
people can apparently become viscerally conscious of illusory objects, suggesting that there 
may be a relatively fuzzy distinction between consciousness of real-world objects and 
imagined-world objects.  
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However, perhaps the fact that we are typically only conscious of real-world objects (rather 
than imagined-world objects) arises from the fact that amount of data transported from our 
sensory organs (e.g. along the visual cortex) is so much larger than for any other part of the 
brain’s neural network. However, the simple volume of data may not be the relevant 
measure here. Instead perhaps the relevant diagnostic is the volume of data synchronised 
across nearby neurons (Singer, 1998). Here, a degree of synchronisation across the neurons 
of the visual cortex could conceivably be induced by the electromagnetic field associated 
with the action potentials of individual neurons (McFadden, 2002).  Here, such 
synchronisation would be a semi-classical process, even though the ion flow in individual 
neurons is quantum mechanical.   
 
In Section 2 we argued that creativity arises from a synergy between two modes of 
operation of the brain. It seems plausible to argue that a similar synergy arises in explaining 
the form of consciousness we call cognition. In her essay on consciousness, Magnusdottir 
(Magnusdottir, 2018) argues that the difference between “conscious experience” and 
“conscious cognition” is that the latter experience is supplemented with some predictive 
model. A predictive model need not be particularly sophisticated – it may simply be enough 
to enable a creature to anticipate the way a predator is likely to pounce. As such, by human 
standards, such a predictive model need not tax System 2 very greatly. However, it implies 
some computational effort in addition to a mere awareness of these counterfactual worlds. 
Hence, like creativity, it would seem that conscious cognition is also an interplay between a 
computational mode and a mode whose essential ingredient is either stochasticity in the 
case of creativity, or counterfactuality in the case of consciousness. It is interesting to note 
that both may have their origins in quantum physics. As Magnussdottir notes, simple 
perceptions and projections can be viewed as unconscious phenomena with and without 
(respectively) a predictive model. Here one could postulate that the synchronised data 
transport associated with such phenomena is not sufficiently great to trigger the type of 
quantum awareness considered here.  
 
Some would argue that consciousness should be defined in terms of some kind of self-
awareness. Indeed Magnusdottir (2018) herself asserts that consciousness requires a type 
of self-similar monitoring. However, the notion of self-awareness could be viewed as an 
extension of the more general notion of awareness of counterfactual alternatives described 
above. If I can perceive a bowl of fruit as having an existence independent of the rest of the 
world, so too I can perceive myself. However, as a subjective comment, I do not believe that 
for most of the time I am as actively conscious of myself as I am of the people and objects I 
interact with (unless I happen to look at myself in a mirror for example). This again is 
consistent with the notion that degree of consciousness of an object (which might include 
ourselves) is dependent on the (synchronous) transport of data which describes the object 
in question, along our neural pathways.  
 
6.  Why is Quantum Physics so Unintuitive? 
 
As an application of the ideas above, consider the question of why quantum physics is so 
unintuitive. We focus on the phenomenon of entanglement on the basis that there is no 
more unintuitive idea in quantum physics than that of nonlocality. According to the Bell 
Theorem, any deterministic theory of quantum physics that satisfies the assumption of 
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Statistical Independence (Hossenfelder and Palmer, 2019), must violate local causality. 
Hence, we seem to require that quantum physics must either be nonlocal (which the 
Bohmian formulation of quantum theory is) or is indeterministic (which the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum theory is). That is to say, we seem to be faced with the choice of 
spooky action at a distance, or of physics governed by randomness. Neither seems 
satisfactory.  
 
The assumption of Statistical Independence ensures that when two or more sub-ensembles 
of quantum particles are being measured with different measurement settings (as occurs in 
a Bell experiment), each sub-ensemble is statistically similar to the others. If it were not 
possible to assume this then the basis for scientific investigation in general would be 
undermined.  
 
However, the assumption of Statistical Independence does more than ensure that sub-
ensembles are statistically independent, it implies a strong form of counterfactual 
definiteness (Hossenfelder and Palmer, 2019). Consider two measurements performed on 
two sub-ensembles of particles: counterfactual definiteness assumes that in principle one 
could have performed the second measurement on the first sub-ensemble (even though in 
practice one did not).  
 
As we have speculated, our intuition about counterfactual words arises from an interplay of 
quantum physical processes in the brain, together with our past experiences. In terms of 
this, any counterfactual world which is sufficiently close to the real world, is a plausible 
world. However, this notion of closeness assumes a metric on state space, and it is natural 
to assume the familiar Euclidean metric. Such an assumption is the product of the deepest 
of all our intuitions. As babies, we try to put nearby brightly coloured objects into our 
mouths (in case they are a source of food or indeed drink). To do this we must bring the 
objects close to our mouths. We learn by trial and error what it means for an object to be 
close to our mouths. We learn by empiricism about the Euclidean metric of space. This is our 
go-to metric.  
 
However, there is no reason for the Euclidean metric to be the correct metric of distance in 
state space rather than physical space. In particular, there is a deterministic theory of 
quantum physics based on fractal geometry, where the relevant metric on state space is p-
adic rather than Euclidean (Palmer, 2019b). Relative to this metric, putative states which lie 
in the gaps in the fractal geometry are necessarily distant from points on the fractal set, 
even when a fractal gap appears very slender and hence insignificant from a Euclidean 
perspective. In a theory where states of physical reality necessarily lie on this fractal set, 
then counterfactual worlds which do not lie on the fractal set are not physically realistic.  
 
By ruling out such counterfactuals we can violate Statistical Independence without violating 
the statistical independence of sub-ensembles of particles occurring in reality. This suggests 
that the reason we find quantum physics so difficult to understand is because our intuition, 
that all counterfactual worlds which sufficiently well resemble the real world are plausible 
worlds, is false. 
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From this perspective, the “weirdness” of quantum physics arises from a cognitive inability 
to discriminate between those counterfactual states of the world which are realistic and 
plausible and those which are not.  To make better sense of contemporary physics it is  
better to avoid using counterfactuals at all, e.g. by saying that I am free if there are no 
constraints preventing me from doing what I want to do (Kane, 2002). Certainly, such real-
world definitions are vital if we are to explain the violation of the Bell inequality in a causal 
theory where experimenters are free agents (Palmer, 2019b; Hossenfelder and Palmer, 
2019).  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
It is postulated that, through its evolution over many millions of years, the miniaturisation 
of the neuronal pathways in the brain has resulted in an exceptionally energy efficient 
organ. The disadvantages of such miniaturisation (e.g. relatively slow reaction times in the 
presence of predators) has been offset by two advantages: an ability to be creative and an 
ability to be aware of the world around us. It is argued that those advantages arise from two 
specific manifestations of energy efficiency: the role of stochastic noise and the role of 
quantum parallelism respectively.  
 
As such, it seems plausible to speculate that it will be impossible to replicate human 
intelligence in strictly deterministic algorithmic machines, as suggested by Penrose (1994). 
However, by trying to solve the energy efficiency problem in high performance computing, 
we may find that we start to produce machines which have intelligence characteristics more 
akin to those of humans.  
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